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VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
AND OUTREACH: LEGAL REFORM
Phong Tran*
I. INTRODUCTION
ANY people have traced Vietnam's socialist formation back to
the country's struggle against colonialism for independence and
peace. Socialism came into Vietnam as a result of the country's
experience with the colonial exploitation and hostility toward the capital-
ist order, Socialism emerged in Vietnam.1 Socialism stressed community
effort, simplicity of lifestyle, equalization of wealth and opportunity, all of
which had strong overtones in Vietnam's Confucian tradition.2 Notably,
Confucian teachings were in conflict with the concepts of materialism and
individualism professed by capitalist economists. Such conditions ori-
ented Vietnamese society and economy toward socialism following the
cause of independence.
In 1975, post-war Vietnam embraced the Soviet economic model of
central planning and state subsidies on a larger scale. The building of
heavy industry and large-scale projects, however, proved inefficient and
drained too many investments. More importantly, the high collectiviza-
tion of the agricultural sector turned farmers into industrial workers.
This forced Vietnam, an agricultural nation, to rely on substantial imports
to fill shortages of rice and other foods. In the mid 1980s, Vietnam's
economy was running short of common goods;3 the annual inflation rate
reached three digits, and people's lives were drastically affected. The eco-
nomic situation of Vietnam was compounded by the Soviet Union's eco-
nomic problems, which sharply reduced its aid to Vietnam. 4 Vietnam
maintained a large budget deficit, and its foreign debt was rising.5
*Phong Tuan Tran is an attorney and partner with VILAF, a Vietnamese interna-
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1. WILLIAM J. DUIKER, Ho CHI MINH: A LIFE 62 (2000).
2. Id. at 63.
3. The Political Report at the Congress VI of Vietnam's Communist Party, available at
http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/nationalcongresses/6thcongress/01 political-report.htm
(last visited on Jan. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Political Report VI].
4. Ky Tran-Trong, A Would-be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam's Prospects for Gaining Most
Favored Nation Status from the United States, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1583, 1588
(1997).
5. Analysis of the Sources of Economic Growth of Vietnam, ECON. DEV. REV., Oct. 1,
1998, available at 1998 WL 15526276 [hereinafter Analysis].
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Recognizing this economic failure, the Vietnamese government initi-
ated the "Doi Moi" policy, or "renovation." This meant implementing a
program of socio-economic reform to transform its centrally planned
economy into a market-based system. The main features of this policy
included the decollectivization of the agricultural sector, price liberaliza-
tion, the relaxation of state control, the diversification of ownership
rights, the establishment of a two-tier banking system, and the opening of
the economy to free market forces. 6
From the outset, the Vietnamese government has recognized the im-
portance of creating a transparent, reliable, and favorable legal system to
underlie the transition to a market economy. This article analyzes Viet-
nam's legal reform during the process of economic transformation in Vi-
etnam thus far. Following an introduction to Vietnam's Doi Moi policy in
part I, part II briefs the social and economic background since the coun-
try's reunification, giving rise to conditions and needs for economic liber-
alization. Part III discusses the initiation of the Doi Moi policy and its
commencement in the earlier phase. This phase is characterized by the
abandonment of the economic command system, although a replacement
system was not adopted until the mid to late 1990s. 7 The cornerstone of
Vietnam's legal reform occurred in this stage with the enactment of the
Law on Foreign Investment in 1987. But the encouragement of foreign
investment was not successful until the next stage, when Vietnam com-
mitted itself to world economic integration. Part IV analyzes the broader
legal reform during Vietnam's integration into the regional and world
economy in the 1990s. A large body of legislation was developed to ad-
dress every aspect of the transitional economy. In addition, Vietnam is
developing its own legal system, which can be characterized as socialist in
nature with elements of both civil and common law. 8
The discussion of Vietnam's legal reform focuses on several main areas
including: state sector; private sector and domestic investment promotion;
foreign investment; contract rights; banking and financial reform; intellec-
tual property protection; and Vietnam's international economic integra-
tion and Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States. A prevailing
concern is whether such a legal system can achieve its consistency, integ-
rity, and efficiency, thereby furthering the economic reform in the wake
of political skepticism and reluctance. Finally, the conclusion gives some
thoughts on future legal reforms.
II. VIETNAM POST-WAR BACKGROUND
Vietnam's postwar economic restructuring took place in the midst of
anti-capitalism. First, Vietnam's attempt to establish diplomatic relations
6. ANNE C. M. J. SCHOT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SOCIAL-
IST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM XXVI (1996).
7. Viet D. Dinh, Financial Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam, 28 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 857, 866 (1997).
8. Schot, supra note 6, at 34.
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with the United States, under the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, failed. 9
Vietnam next aligned with the Soviet Union and isolated itself from coun-
tries existing outside the communist bloc. As a result, the country limited
its international trade relations to the Comecon.' 0 The economy de-
pended solely upon monetary aid from the Soviet Union. 1"
Soon after the war ended in 1975, the "socialist transformation" pro-
gram was implemented in every aspect of the Vietnamese economy. The
market economy in the South was converted and merged into the nation-
wide central-planned economy. Private businesses were confiscated and
nationalized. The government controlled the domestic market through
its central plans and targets, and the operation of state-owned enter-
prises. In the agricultural sector, the collective system was implemented
on a large scale in terms of organization and management. Under a
workday based system, farmers labored on their land as workers. Only
two types of ownership rights and economic sectors were constitutionally
recognized: state ownership (or, as the Vietnamese call it, the ownership
belonging to the entire people) and collective ownership. In 1980, Viet-
nam's Constitution abolished the private sector that had previously ex-
isted. The "socialist transformation" program rested on the Marxist view
of hegemony, in which markets are neither mixed nor neutral, but a re-
flection of politics.' 2 State control therefore, was exercised in both politi-
cal and economic structures.
From 1976 to 1980, the Vietnamese government pooled most of the
country's resources to reconstruct the economy toward the building of
heavy industry and large-scale projects. No market existed in 'a practical
sense because all purchases, sales, and prices were controlled by the gov-
ernment.1 3 In addition, economic planners paid no attention to the pro-
duction of consumer goods and export commodities. As a result, the
economy soon dried up due to the low efficiency of an overly saturated
market for capital construction. The limited supplies caused prices to
rise. Furthermore, the government increased foreign borrowing to fi-
nance imports, resulting in a large budget deficit.
In the agricultural sector, farmers became members of collectives and
surrendered their right to control land. Farmers, like workers in indus-
trial factories, had to sell the crops at low prices that were fixed by the
government. 14 Farmers were grouped in collectives, sharing the farming
and related work. 15 Crops were distributed to members based on their
9. Davis Frye, Vietnam's Contemporary Battle with the United States: Vying for Most
Favored Nation Trading Status, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 781 (1996).
10. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance established among socialist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe.
11. Frye, supra note 9, at 812.
12. Lan Cao, Reflection on Market Reform in Post-War, Post-Embargo Vietnam, 22
WHITTIER L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2001).
13. Le Khoa, Vietnam: Relation Between Economic and Administrative Reforms,




142 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
workday calculations. Farmers had no real interest in the land since their
compensation was based on their workday productivity, as opposed to the
production of the farm. State-sponsored food companies were instructed
to purchase crops from collectives with no discretion as to the quality or
quantity of the products. This system further diminished incentives for
farmers to invest in the land, improve quality and productivity, or raise
output. As a result, Vietnam had to import about one million tons of rice
each year during this period. 16
Faced with the economic inefficiency and a shortage of food, the
Vietnamese government implemented limited adjustments in the agricul-
tural sector in the early 1980s. To create incentives for farm production,
collective farmers contracted for a specific output and enjoyed the excess
production. This adjustment helped to increase agricultural production
without significant investment. 17
Some people trace the inception of Vietnam's economic reform back to
such agricultural adjustments. In practice, it was not unusual for farmers
to disregard the state imposed mechanism and take their own initiatives
to change the farming production and management. The government
could then react by officially adopting the new adjustments. This practice
shows that the so-called reform was very limited. The adjustments did
not root out the inherent problem of the mandatory collectivization in
agriculture that prevented farmers from reaping the benefits of their land.
By the mid 1980s, despite some economic adjustments, the Vietnamese
economy was dysfunctional. The building of heavy industry failed to ad-
dress the need to develop production, improve the supply of goods, or
meet the people's needs.18 The bureaucratic and centrally planned sys-
tem blocked all market forces. Likewise, the dynamic economy of private
businesses was restricted. In the agricultural sector, farmers lacked per-
sonal interest in cultivation under the collectivization structure. To make
matters worse, a black market was emerging with much higher prices,
absorbing from the organized market the already scarce supply of
goods. 19 In 1985, in efforts to cope with the increasing inflation, the gov-
ernment responded by raising prices in the public sector, increasing
wages, and revaluing the currency (by administrative withdrawal of
money supply from circulation). Despite the government's efforts, after
these changes the inflation reached a rate of 775 percent.20 Conse-
quently, state subsidies further increased the budget deficit.
Vietnam's international trade had no positive move in the wake of the
United States's trade embargo imposed on Vietnam. Economic contracts
with Vietnam were prohibited, including commercial exports to Vietnam
of all but the most basic humanitarian commodities, and imports of all
16. See id.
17. See Analysis, supra note 5, and accompanying text.
18. Political Report VI, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
19. Khoa, supra note 13.
20. See Analysis, supra note 5.
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Vietnamese commodities into the United States. 21 Vietnam was isolated
from the rest of the world outside the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, a radical
reform to improve the social and economic downgrade was led by
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. In addition, China had gained success in
a shift to a market economy almost a decade earlier. Thus, the interna-
tional context influenced the Vietnamese leaders toward a fundamental
reform to overcome this domestic dilemma.
III. DOI MOI POLICY AND INITIAL
ECONOMIC LEGISLATIONS
From the outset, Vietnam's Doi Moi policy followed the movement of
social and economic relaxation among the socialist countries led by the
Soviet Union's reform in the mid to late 1980s. The main objective of this
reform was to revitalize the economy under government control. This
characteristic was conceptualized as a mixed economy in a transitional
period in the initial stage of a socialist evolution.22 Initial efforts of Doi
Moi focused on the decollectivization of the agricultural sector, price lib-
eralization, and diversification of ownership rights. The concept of a
multi-sector economy was introduced, comprising the state sector, collec-
tive sector, small-scaled individual business sector (including individual
farmers), private capitalist sector, and state-capitalist sector (i.e. joint
form of state and private ownership). 23
In 1986, Vietnam initiated the Doi Moi policy and commenced the so-
cial and economic reform to revitalize the stagnant economy. The gov-
ernment had abandoned its system of economic command and control,
but did not clearly adopt a replacement. 24 The budget deficit swelled to
10 percent of the gross domestic product. Savings were negative and the
value of exports was less than half of the import bill for 1988.25 Inflation
remained at its peak of three digits, and macroeconomic policies were out
of control. It was not until late 1988 that the Vietnamese government
made a turnaround into the array of the market oriented transformation,
and implemented a series of accelerated reform measures. Official price
controls were abolished for almost all goods and services in the economy,
and consumer goods sold through state outlets were priced at the free
market level. 26 The Dong was devalued drastically to bring the official
rate in line with the prevailing market rate. State-owned enterprises were
granted more autonomy, and official state allocations and planning
targets were abandoned. 27
21. Cao, supra note 12, at 1038.
22. The concept of a mixed economy can be traced back to Lenin's New Economic
Policy of the late 1910s and early 1920s in the Soviet Union.
23. Political Report VI, supra note 3.
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One radical change introduced by Doi Moi was the opening of the
economy to foreign investment. Due to this feature, Doi Moi is well
known as the "open door policy." The Vietnamese government hoped
foreign investment would aid the ailing economy and improve its eco-
nomic environment. The Law on Foreign Investment (LFI) was enacted
on December 29, 1987, and was recognized as one of the most liberal
foreign investment laws among the developing countries. 28 Incidentally,
the LFI was the first economic legislation ever enacted by the Vietnamese
Congress. The LFI has played an important role in developing and re-
forming the Vietnamese legal system for a market economy.
The LFI expressly guarantees that the invested capital and assets of
foreign investors will not be requisitioned or expropriated, and that an
enterprise with foreign invested capital will not be nationalized.29 Direct
foreign investment may be made through one of the following forms
under the LFI: (i) Joint Venture Company, (ii) Wholly Foreign Owned
Company, and (iii) Business Cooperation Contract. 30 Build-Operate-
Transfer Company is often referred to as another investment form al-
though it essentially falls into the former categories. 31 Foreign investment
projects are only authorized to commence business upon the issuance of
the investment license.
The encouragement of foreign investment reflects both Vietnam's po-
litical preference and strategy. The domestic private sector was ideologi-
cally disfavored and had been constrained for several years. The
Vietnamese government looked to foreign capital as a proper means to
revitalize the ailing economy. In addition, by jointly participating in for-
eign investment projects through state-owned enterprises, the
Vietnamese government hoped to supervise this economic activity. State
capitalism was a preferred concept and way of doing business. Therefore,
in the initial stage, the LFI required businesses in most areas to be set up
in the form of a joint venture in which state-owned enterprises held at
least 30 percent of the contributed capital. The joint venture company's
board of management was to make most important business decisions on
a unanimous basis. This decision-making mechanism gives minority
shareholders, normally Vietnamese state-owned enterprises, a veto right.
Many joint venture companies needed to convert into wholly foreign
owned companies under government approval at the later stage.
Along with the policy on foreign investment encouragement, Vietnam's
recognition of a multi-sector economy legitimizes private businesses and
farming households. This recognition initially brought about significant
progress in agriculture. The collectives were decentralized, which left
farming households responsible for production. Farming households
28. Due V. Trang, The Practice of Law and Foreign Investment in Vietnam, 22 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2001); Thomas R. Stauch, The United States and Vietnam:
Overcoming the Past and Investing in the Future, 28 INT'L LAW. 995, 1011 (1994).
29. Law on Foreign Investment (Dec. 29, 1987) (Vietnam).
30. Id.
31. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 51.
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were allocated land and given the right to dispose of their crops, thus
allowing farmers to benefit from their productivity. This led to increased
agricultural production, and the country was able to afford its require-
ment of food for the first time, particularly with respect to imported rice.
Self-financed business households were emerging in various production
and service areas, signaling the increase in business activities.
The Law on Companies and the Law on Private Enterprises, enacted
on December 21, 1990, allowed private investors to start up and run their
business as a limited liability company, shareholding company, or "pri-
vate enterprise" (i.e. sole proprietorship). 32 The limited liability com-
pany is essentially a privately held corporation while the shareholding
company is based on the structure of a public corporation.33 Neverthe-
less, private investors showed their reluctance to invest, especially in pro-
duction, because of a lack of a guaranteed business environment and a
lack of confidence in the stability of state policies. As a result, the govern-
ment did not promote private businesses. During this period, one rarely
saw any government policies, administrative or economic, that supported
private businesses. Consequently, this primitive market and cumbersome
bureaucracy paralyzed private businesses.
This gave rise to the most difficult and continuous reform, the reform
of the state economic sector. A large number of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) had been set up without considering efficiency. SOEs had strong
social and political motivations to function as job generators under the
government's umbrella. In the transitional period, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment planned to allow SOEs to operate autonomously where they
would be largely subject to market forces. In 1987, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment stopped subsidizing SOEs for the most part. As a result, the
top-down state plans and targets were reduced substantially. Rather than
providing direct funds, the government funded SOEs through bank loans,
and in return SOEs have an obligation to repay these loans with inter-
est.34 The SOEs management was authorized to direct day-to-day busi-
ness activities, with the sponsoring ministries' power being limited to
state management over SOEs (as opposed to business administration).
That was the first step aimed at separating the ownership rights and the
management rights of SOEs. Many people compared the autonomy of
the SOEs with the self-management right of farming households. The
government's decision breathed a new spirit into the operation of SOEs,
and SOEs began to produce most of the national output. Specifically,
32. Law on Companies (Dec. 21, 1990) (Vietnam); Law on Private Enterprises (Dec.
21, 1990) (Vietnam).
33. Vietnamese corporate forms, however, follow French models of "Societe a
Responsabilite Limitee" and "Societe Anonyme." Pham Van Thuyet, Legal
Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional Economies: The Case
of Vietnam, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 541, 563 (1996); quoting GEORGES RIPERT
& RENE ROBLOT, TRAITE DE TROIT COMMERCIAL [TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
LAW] (Michel Germain ed., 15th ed. 1993) (detailing the structural variations
among French corporate forms).
34. See Analysis, supra note 5.
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SOEs played a significant role in encouraging foreign investment, not-
withstanding the absence of a strong private sector. In practice, however,
SOEs have never gone beyond state interventions, or been able to over-
come their bureaucratic style of management. Thus, SOEs continue to be
at the forefront of Vietnam's economic reforms.
The development of contractual rights in Vietnam was designed to ac-
commodate transactions in the market setting. Previously, exchanges of
goods had been based on state plans and orders to fulfill the state im-
posed targets. State controlled entities had no right to negotiate business
transactions. The rights and obligations of the state controlled entities
were administrative in nature, and governed by administrative
regulations.
The Vietnamese Congress issued two separate sets of laws and regula-
tions on contracts: "economic" and "civil."' 35 This distinction in legal the-
ory is based on the nature of participants and their objectives in
contractual transactions. The economic contract regulations govern con-
tracts that are entered between legal entities for a commercially profita-
ble purpose (as opposed to individual consumers). Meanwhile, the civil
contract regulations govern transactions for consumer consumption
purposes.
The distinction results in differences in legal rights and obligations,
remedies, and dispute settlement procedures, and the like. Similar to
contract laws of many former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union,36 this distinction reflected the substantial reten-
tion of the state control in the economy. The Ordinance on Economic
Contracts states in its foreword that it governs the economic contractual
relations that involve state targets and plans.37 The Ordinance on Eco-
nomic Contracts does not appear to anticipate contractual relations
among various business entities other than state entities. The legally arti-
ficial segregation of contractual transactions has proved difficult to apply
to the diversified participants in the market. Different contract regimes
create difficulty for contractual parties to assess their obligations, rights,
and remedies. The dichotomy between economic and civil contracts
makes the contract law less predictable and efficient.
Banking law is another important part of the legal framework support-
ing the market system. The renovation of the Vietnamese banking system
started with the issuance of two Ordinances on May 23, 1990, thus shift-
ing the one-tiered banking system into a two-tiered system.38 The State
Bank is the country's central bank. It is charged with managing money,
credit, and banking operations throughout the country in order to stabi-
lize the value of money.39 It does not, however, function as a commercial
35. Ordinance on Economic Contracts (Sept. 25, 1989) (Vietnam); Ordinance on Civil
Contracts (Apr. 29, 1991) (Vietnam).
36. Trang, supra note 28, at 1080.
37. Ordinance on Economic Contracts (Sept. 25, 1989) (Vietnam).
38. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 142.
39. Dinh, supra note 7, at 874-75.
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bank by lending directly to any enterprise, agency, economic organiza-
tion, or private person.
The State Bank regulates and oversees the banking services of the com-
mercial banks. In its regulatory capacity, the State Bank grants and re-
vokes operating licenses, issues regulations, and acts as a clearing-house
for credit institutions. 40 Banking business is organized in the form of
state-owned commercial banks, shareholding commercial banks, joint
venture banks (with foreign banks), and branches of foreign banks. Other
financial business forms are credit cooperatives and financial companies.
The commercial banking system remains dominated by state-owned
banks. This is largely because the State Bank gives preferential treatment
to the state-owned commercial banks, and foreign or joint venture banks
are limited by regulatory constraints. 41 According to official figures, the
four state-owned commercial banks accounted for 77 percent of deposits
and 89 percent of loans in 1989, and the World Bank estimates that they
"accounted for nearly 90 percent of total assets held by deposit money
banks."42
Although being chartered as commercial banks to operate for profit,
the state-owned banks are often required to extend credit to state-owned
enterprises at low interest rates, which are offset by charging higher inter-
est rates to other state-owned enterprises with higher profit potential.43
This arrangement of credit extension disrupted the banks' capital market
as a means of efficient capital allocation and economic development.
44
IV. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND LEGAL REFORM
DURING THE 1990S
Vietnam's social and economic improvements following radical policies
adopted since the mid to late 1980s favored furthering the reform pro-
cess. For example, rice production overcame the chronic shortage, thus
exceeding domestic consumption and enabling an export surplus. 45 In
addition, state subsidies, through capital allocations, prices for basic raw
materials, and wages declined substantially, which helped reduce the
budget deficit. Lastly, free exchange of goods and relaxation of price
controls encouraged production and servicing activities. A multi-sector
economy was emerging.
Coupled with the progress in domestic markets, the international situa-
tion in the early 1990s turned Vietnam to commit to world economic inte-
gration. By this time, the Soviet Union's aid was about to end. Vietnam
40. See id. at 875.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Dinh, supra note 7, at 877.
44. Id.
45. By the end of 1988, Vietnam for the first time exported 450,000 tons of rice. See
The Political Report at the Congress VII of Vietnam's Communist Party, available at
http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/nationalcongresses/7thcongress/political-report.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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began the process of normalization with China given the past relationship
between the two communist neighbors had been frozen for more than a
decade. For the first time, Vietnam proclaimed "for equal and mutually
beneficial co-operation with all countries regardless of different socio-po-
litical systems and on the basis of the principle of peaceful co-exis-
tence."' 46 The Vietnamese government sought to improve its relations
with the Western world, particularly by normalizing its relationship with
the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union and other Eastern
European communist countries pushed the Vietnamese economy closer
to a market-based system.
The Vietnamese Communist Party's Seventh Congress in 1991 was
viewed as the watershed for the reform process in Vietnam. Comprehen-
sive policies were adopted in anticipation of a mixed market economy.
Setting the stage for substantial changes, legal reform was given priority.
In 1992, the country's Constitution was amended to allow the multi-sector
economy and restructure the government system. The 1992 Constitution
laid the foundation for issuing and amending the most important laws and
regulations affecting Vietnam's transitional economy.
A. STATE SECTOR
The continuing reform of the state sector reflects, to the highest extent,
the tension between market-oriented and control policies in Vietnam. It
also indicates an ideological implication in the reform process, particu-
larly in legal reform. Unlike the transitional economies in Eastern Eu-
rope and Russia, where the state-owned capital and assets were
privatized on a large scale, Vietnam opted to retain the dominance of the
state sector. The state sector is determined to lead and become the foun-
dation of the multi-sector economy. 47 The Vietnamese government had
hoped, through the dominant state sector, to be able to direct the econ-
omy to its objectives.
However, the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy will not
be evaluated if the state sector is seen as having a "dominant presence."
A "boom" in formation of state-owned enterprises in every economic
area came away from government control. A large number of SOEs
proved inefficient as a result of undisciplined management. Insolvent
SOEs were freezing state investment capital since there was no effective
legal procedure for bankruptcy and liquidation. In 1991 and 1992, the
government carried out SOE reorganization and attempted to eliminate
half of the SOEs, which would have reduced of the number of SOEs to
approximately 6,000.
The reorganization of SOEs continued with the enactment of the Law
of State-owned Enterprises in 1995 (LSOE).48 The LSOE was a great
effort to regulate and strengthen the activities of SOEs. It sets out proce-
46. See id.
47. VIETNAM CONST. 1992, art. 19.
48. Law on State-owned Enterprises (1995) (Vietnam).
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dures for establishment, reorganization and dissolution of SOEs; the
rights and obligations of SOEs in business transactions and to the govern-
ment; and the management of SOEs. The SOE is organized in the form of
a limited liability company in which the government is the sole owner.
The LSOE stipulates that the SOE is an independent legal entity, and
limits its liabilities to its allocated capital. It should be noted that the
legal separation does not restrict the government from asserting sover-
eign immunity in transactions involved in by SOEs with foreign parties.
The separation of state ownership and SOE's autonomy is articulated
through the management's structure and responsibilities. Imitation of the
private company's management with the board of management (i.e. the
board of directors) is copied into large state corporations. Those large
state corporations were established in all important economic areas,
maintaining monopoly power in most cases. In practice, however, the
board of management proves bureaucratic and dysfunctional, since it acts
as a quasi-administrative agency rather than a business supervising body.
Bureaucratic and troublesome characteristics inherent to the SOE
management continue to result in many unprofitable SOEs. Privatization
(or the preferred term of "equitization" used in Vietnam) emerged as a
method of restructuring and reducing SOEs. Vietnam is seen as following
the Chinese model of reform by the retention of the dominant state sec-
tor and the creation of a parallel private sector.49 In this context, priva-
tization is aimed to those twin purposes. The initial understanding of the
state sector's "dominant presence" has been changed in a practical sense
in that SOEs remain in some key economic areas, as well as in areas
where private investors are unwilling to participate. From this point of
view, private investment is encouraged in every business except for lim-
ited areas in which the government maintains a monopoly.
In 1992, the Vietnamese government commenced its pilot program to
sell the stock of some SOEs to foreign investors. Then in 1995, it issued a
regulation setting out a procedure to sell the stock of SOEs to private
investors. Despite the legal framework, the privatization process has
made little progress so far due to both technical and conceptual issues.
Questions about the value of land use rights as well as asset evaluation
have hindered the privatization process. 50 SOEs' sponsoring ministries,
management, and employees to some extent, resist the sale of SOEs due
to either their own interests or ideological unwillingness. It is seen that
the conversion from state to private ownership in SOEs would need a
level of reform that would soften ideological perception. In the wake of
economic globalization, many expect that the need for the economy's ef-
ficiency and competitiveness would accelerate the privatization process in
Vietnam.
49. Cao, supra note 12, at 1040.
50. Dinh, supra note 7, at 885; Woranant Krongbooying, Vietnam: Accounting Revamp
May Aid Privatization, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 14, 1995.
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Vietnam's Constitution, as most recently amended on December 25,
2001, emphasizes the importance of the continuing consolidation of the
state sector, especially in the key areas. It remains to be seen which ap-
proach the Vietnamese government will adopt to reform this dominant
sector of the economy.
B. PRIVATE SECTOR AND DOMESTIC INVESTMENT PROMOTION
Vietnam's pursuit of state sector dominance has adversely affected the
development of the private sector. Initial legislation on private busi-
nesses focused more on control rather than promoting business growth. 51
Business forms under both the Law on Private Enterprises and the Law
on Companies were subject to various restrictions, namely state approval
for establishment (separate from business registration), open ending of
pre-incorporation documents, expensive cost of incorporation, minimum
capital requirement, additional special licenses for a number of activities,
closure to foreign investors, and limited involvement in foreign invested
projects. The two-tier incorporation procedure vested in the discretion of
state agencies was an uncertain and time-consuming process. This frus-
trated private trying investors starting up their own businesses. Many in-
vestors complained that in order to put their business into operation they
were facing multiple barriers through various government agencies' "sub-
licensing procedures." Many others could not get out of the process. In
addition, the government's financing policy did not favor private busi-
nesses. State credit support was solely conferred on state-owned enter-
prises. Furthermore, banks required equivalent collateral for any grant of
loan even though private businesses are mostly small-scale. Real estate, a
business's most valuable asset, would not meet the bank's collateral re-
quirements because, until recently, land could not be mortgaged and
liquidated.
In contrast to restrictions imposed on the starting of a business, rele-
vant legislation does not delineate an effective supervisory framework for
the operation of private businesses. This situation led to the overwhelm-
ing fraudulent and illegal activities of private businesses that slowed
down the already weak private sector. In effect, legal restrictions, impedi-
ments, and loopholes have constrained the private sector.
In pursuit of its new focus on domestic capital, in the late 1990s the
Vietnamese government reexamined the private sector and carried out
significant reforms designed to foster this sector. The Law on Domestic
Investment Promotion (LODIP), adopted on June 22, 1994, revamped
the existing regulatory ground of private businesses, even though it fo-
cuses on a broader scope of domestic investment (including investment
made by SOEs).52 Central to the LODIP is a wide range of investment
incentives granted to domestic investments in certain economic areas.
51. Thuyet, supra note 33, at 564.
52. Law on Domestic Investment Promotion (June 22, 1994) (Vietnam).
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This policy aims to support domestic investors in their competition with
foreign investors who enjoy favorable incentives under the foreign invest-
ment legislation. 53 Vietnamese overseas investors can choose either form
of foreign or domestic investment. In other words, the existing laws on
private businesses were opened to Vietnamese overseas investors though
the channel of domestic investment promotion. In addition, foreign inves-
tors are allowed to own up to 30 percent of a private company with the
government's approval, though such approval has been rare so far.
The enactment of the Law on Enterprises (LOE), adopted on January
1, 2000, is seen as a radical change to the legal framework governing pri-
vate businesses. 54 The LOE consolidates the previous Law on Private
Enterprises and Law on Companies, and expands its scope to cover most
private business forms. Partnership and parent-subsidiary companies are
added to the existing forms of shareholding company, limited liability
company, and private enterprise.
One of the major changes made by the LOE is the abolition of state
approval for establishing a business. Now applicants can register their
business without waiting for government approval. Application docu-
ments and their standard forms are to be expressly fixed by the LOE,
leaving no discretion to the business registration authority. Business ac-
tivities that are subject to additional conditions are to be stipulated by
laws, as opposed to subordinate regulations to be issued by the govern-
ment or its agencies. This is designed to keep the certainty of business
incorporation away from the varying interpretation and intervention of
administrative authorities. The total number of private businesses
doubled after just a year following the LOE's effective date and is consid-
ered to be an astonishing result. The liberal legal authority set out by the
LOE, however, has still been tested in practice as government agencies
resist losing their power in the business incorporation process through
their own licenses. The Vietnamese government has made a great effort
to remove eighty-four licenses, but 300 such licenses still remain.55 This
reality shows the burden of Vietnam's administrative reform accompany-
ing any possible success of more liberal economic policies.
The LOE also incorporated the provision on foreign shares introduced
by the Law on Domestic Investment Promotion. However, no further
step was taken to relax the government's case-by-case approval proce-
dure of foreign investors' participation. Foreign investment through this
channel remains far from being encouraged. A view is arising to support
an ambitious plan to expand the LOE's scope covering every business
form in the Vietnamese economy. This view is based on the need of level-
ing legal ground of all business forms for fair competition. State-owned
53. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 16.
54. Law on Enterprises (Jan. 1, 2000) (Vietnam).
55. Norman Brown IV, The Long Road to Reform: an Analysis of Foreign Investment
Reform in Vietnam, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 102 (2002). According to a
report of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, there are 192 business
licenses, and the like, existing up to July 25, 2002.
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enterprises are argued to be in the LOE's form of limited liability com-
pany of a sole owner (the government, for example), while the foreign
investment forms are currently compatible with those of the LOE. Such
accomplishment is not simply vested on legal restructure in the context of
Vietnam's current policy of different treatments among businesses of dif-
ferent sectors.
C. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The 1992 Constitution reflects the strong commitment of the
Vietnamese leaders toward encouraging foreign investment.56 The Law
on Foreign Investment was amended in 1990 and 1992 in an effort to
streamline the investment licensing procedure widely known to be slow
and cumbersome. The government issued a large body of implementing
regulations to provide detailed guidance on foreign investment. The gov-
ernment's investment licensing authority was designed to be "a one-stop
shop." Positive implementation of the LFI was made in the context of
the collapse of the communist bloc in the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope. This prompted Vietnam to shift course to world economic integra-
tion. Foreign investors saw Vietnam as a promising market. Many hoped
the country's timely reform with its "large number of literate and en-
trepreneurial people, coupled with Vietnam's close proximity to China"
would make it "the perfect Asian niche economy. ' 57 Vietnam started
recording significant annual increases in inward foreign investment
capital.
It is commonly known, however, that foreign investment inflow is not
solely based on the host country's adequate legal framework. In the
height of a foreign investment surge in Vietnam by the mid 1990s, the
LFI's investment licensing procedure was not reduced much in terms of
its bureaucratic and troublesome features. In practice, the licensing au-
thority coordinated the review of the license application by the various
central and local government agencies and it was referred to as "a one-
stop shop with many doors."'58 Foreign investors at that time were ad-
vised to anticipate at least a six-to-eight month wait before they would
get an investment license. Application processing took from several
months to occasionally several years despite the set timeframe.59 It was
not unusual for foreign investors, upon receiving a license, to return to
the licensing authority because the market conditions changed while their
application was pending.
The post-investment licensing procedure was another headache for for-
eign investors. To put their projects into operation, foreign investors
were required to obtain various government agencies' approvals and con-
56. VIETNAM CONST. 1992, art. 25.
57. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 97-98; Tuyen Quang, All Go Below, All Caution
Above, ECONOMIsT, June 10, 2000, at 48.
58. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 54.
59. Id. at 57.
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sents, including a land use right certificate, import-export license, con-
struction permit, approval of technology transfer, environmental
certificate, accounting registration, and expatriate's work permit. Thus,
foreign investment projects are exposed to administrative intervention
and abuse.
Many foreign investors expected that the Vietnamese government
would continue introducing more liberal economic policies, to keep pace
with the progress of free markets. From the foreign investors' perspec-
tive, however, the amendment of the LFI in 1996 did little or nothing to
clear the way for foreign investment. This revision simply incorporated
existing subordinate regulations into law. The amendment failed to intro-
duce a new principle or method to reduce the current obstacles facing
foreign investors. Instead, the attempts by hardliners to tighten the regu-
lation of foreign investment found its way into the 1996 revision. The
scope of unanimous approval maintained its hardship in the operation of
joint venture enterprises. The 1996 revision allowed the investment li-
censing authority to terminate a joint venture project before its expira-
tion upon request by any party. Foreign investors saw this provision as
jeopardizing the prospect of foreign investment projects. If a project is
terminated early, foreign investors would suffer great losses because they
normally contribute financial capital to create fixed assets. Vietnamese
parties would not risk such losses, since their capital contribution is
mainly land and buildings. Furthermore, Vietnamese parties, often state-
owned enterprises with strong connections to the government, would in-
fluence the licensing authority whenever conflict arises with foreign
parties.
A wave of foreign investment moving out of Vietnam signaled
problems much earlier than the Asian crisis. In addition to Vietnam's
weak and underdeveloped economic and financial framework, 60 foreign
investors were frustrated with the bureaucratic and troublesome adminis-
trative system. This is partly due to the fact that the Vietnamese govern-
ment showed its reluctance to encourage the infusion of foreign capital.
The government switched its focus to domestic investment without fully
considering the potential impact on foreign investment. Foreign investors
viewed the Vietnamese government's campaign against "social evils" in
1996 as discouraging foreign investment given that they were prohibited
from placing foreign names on their shops.61 Consequently, foreign inves-
tors started to leave the country.
Vietnam was not beyond the reach of the Asian crisis, despite the fact
that its market has not been opened to foreign portfolio investment (as
opposed to foreign direct investment). On one hand, this led to a large
withdrawal of foreign investment from Vietnam, putting many projects
into deadlock. On the other hand, the Asian crisis cast doubt upon the
wisdom of opening the Vietnamese market to the West, thus causing the
60. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 99.
61. Id.; Goodnight, Vietnam, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000, at 65.
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country to slow any ongoing reform that would have eased foreign entry
into its market.62 Inward foreign investment fell back to the level of the
early 1990s. 63 Foreign investment decline created difficulties for Viet-
nam's balance of payment in the short run, since the country gradually
lost its ability to service its debts and payment for current transactions. 64
Furthermore, the long-term effect of the decline led to difficulty in fi-
nancing economic development and growth. 65
Since 1999, the Vietnamese government has attempted to renew the
reform process to push up the stagnant economy by opening the country
once again to foreign investment. 66 Pending amendment of the LFI, the
government issued a number of urgent measures to encourage foreign
investment. Those measures focused on higher tax incentives, preferen-
tial treatments, and the cut and reduction of various pre and post invest-
ment licensing procedures. The LFI was amended, effective July 1, 2000,
to create a more favorable legal framework for foreign investors. This
aims to maintain the existing foreign investors and to attract new ones.
The amended LFI grants foreign invested enterprises the right to mort-
gage their land use rights with banks. This amendment is considered very
important because it creates new means of financing for foreign invested
projects to raise capital.67 Other amendments aimed to aid foreign in-
vestment include: (i) the guarantees of government's loan; (ii) the aboli-
tion of the compulsory reserve fund, which is now subject to the decision
of foreign invested enterprises; (iii) the reduction of the profit-remittance
tax; (iv) the liquidation of the remaining value of land use rights as capital
contribution to joint venture enterprises; (v) the relaxation of require-
ment on investment forms and capital structure;68 and (vi) the lessening
of the unanimity principle in join venture enterprises.
The amended LFI made a step towards reforming the investment li-
censing procedure. The approval procedure was replaced by a registra-
tion procedure for foreign investment projects that satisfy prescribed
criteria, e.g. export rate and categories of business sectors and geographi-
cal areas. For those projects, foreign investors do not have to secure gov-
ernment approvals before they are able to legally invest as foreign
companies in the Vietnamese market. 69 Furthermore, the post licensing
burden on foreign investors must be reduced, particularly for land site
clearance. Vietnamese parties or the local authority must now take this
responsibility.
These amendments are appreciated as a positive move towards alleviat-
62. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 99; Goodnight Vietnam, supra note 61.
63. Straight Talk: US Ambassador Offers some Blunt Advice on Investment, VIETNAM
ECON. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, available at 1998 WL 29277366.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 100; Pulling Teeth, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2001, at 71.
67. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 101;
68. Id.
69. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 101; Margot Cohen, A Glimmer of Hope, FAR E.
ECON. REv., June 8, 2000, at 76.
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ing the day-to-day headaches faced by foreign investors in Vietnam.70
However, Vietnam is only half way there, as a large number of proposed
favorable changes were not incorporated.71 The amended LFI has not
overcome its restrictive nature imposed by the 1996 version toward liber-
alization of the foreign investment framework in Vietnam.
D. CONTRACT RIGHTS
The development of contractual rights in Vietnam reached its stage of
proliferation in the late 1990s with the enactment of the Civil Code and
the Commercial Law. The Civil Code, enacted on October 28, 1995, and
effective on July 1, 1996, is viewed as the most fundamental legislation
second to the Constitution. Adopting the French Civil Code model, the
Civil Code is the most comprehensive code ever enacted, governing a
broad scope of legal relations in the society (namely individuality, legal
personality, obligations, contracts, housing, intellectual property, foreign
element's involvement, and the like). Contract rules under the Civil
Code are introduced in a separate chapter that sets out contract forma-
tion, contractual rights and obligations, breaches, remedies, and types of
specific contracts.
Contrary to expectation, the Civil Code does not expressly address the
dichotomy between the civil and economic contracts. 72 The Civil Code
was promulgated to supersede the Ordinance on Civil Contracts (OCC),
as well as other prior relevant legal documents. Thus, the segregation of
civil and economic contracts still exists after the Civil Code. However,
there is neither a stipulation in the Civil Code referring to the economic
contract, nor one defining the "civil" contract as did by the OCC. There-
fore, the question is whether the Civil Code's contract rules should be
narrowly applied to solely govern civil contracts or should the Civil
Code's general rules on contract formation and performance should be
broadly applied to any contracts, including economic contracts.
The view supporting the narrow application of the Civil Code's con-
tract rules is based on the following rationales. By superseding the OCC,
the Civil Code does not implicate the Ordinance on Economic Contracts
(OEC). Therefore, the Civil Code and the OEC function as two continu-
ing separate sets of rules that govern civil and economic contracts, respec-
tively. In the absence of a definition, the "civil" contract is now
understood to be different than the economic contract as defined by the
OEC. This view narrows the scope of the Civil Code by continuing the
previous legal fiction of contracts without relying on any authority from
the Civil Code.
The other view supports the broad application of the Civil Code in an
effort to reduce the tension in application of relevant contract rules, and
70. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 102.
71. Only twenty-three out of the seventy-five proposed amendments were written into
law. Id. at 103.
72. Trang, supra note 28, at 1082.
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integrate Vietnamese contract laws. This view agrees that the Civil Code
will govern contracts falling outside the OEC's definition of economic
contract. Because of the absence of a definition in the Civil Code or else-
where, the "civil" contract exists as a practical designation (as opposed to
economic contract) rather than a legal designation. Having ceased its ex-
istence, the OCC did not pass any legal definition or effect. In addition, in
its broad scope, the Civil Code governs not only "civil" or consumer
transactions, but also commercial and business transactions (a clear ex-
ample is its regulations on intellectual property licensing and technology
transfer). Therefore, the Civil Code is not limited to non-business rela-
tions. In that context, the Civil Code can be seen as providing general
contract rules while the OEC provides specific contract rules, for exam-
ple, those for economic contracts. Thus, economic contracts must be gov-
erned by the OEC specifically. But in the absence of specific rules under
the OEC, the relevant contract rules in the Civil Code will apply. Fur-
ther, the OEC's specific rules should not contradict the general contract
principles set out by the Civil Code. This principle would exist according
to the hierarchy between the Civil Code and the OEC, that is, the OEC is
an ordinance subordinate to a code or law. More importantly, this princi-
ple would ensure the integration of the contract law framework by creat-
ing a gap filling mechanism.
The issue of the Commercial Law cast further doubt upon the clarity of
Vietnamese contract laws. The Commercial Law governs "commercial
acts" among business entities, including the sale and purchase of goods,
business representation, agency, and other trade related activities. The
Commercial Law provides for contract formation, rights and obligations,
as well as performance and remedies for each specific type of commercial
contract.
The Commercial Law follows the notion of the dualistic legal system
(similar to that of France or Germany), which applies special rules to
commercial contracts different from the general rules on sales. In that
system, it does matter whether a party is a merchant or not. However,
the Commercial Code does not clarify its scope in relation to the OEC
and economic contracts. 73 As a result, another set of contract rules is
added to the already overlapping legal framework of contract law in Viet-
nam. Although the Commercial Law's contracts appear to be specific
types in comparison with economic contracts; there is no clear answer as
to whether the OEC would act as the gap-fillers of the Commercial
Law.
7 4
In relation to the Civil Code, the Commercial Law refers to various
specific contract rules of the Civil Code instead of stipulating on its own.
This reference, on the one hand, affirms the above discussion that the
Civil Code contract rules are not limited to non-commercial transactions.
On the other hand, this reference indicates a possibility to refine Viet-
73. Id. at 1083.
74. Id. at 1084.
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nam's contract laws, in which the Civil Code's contract rules are to be
gap-fillers for any specific type of contract and rules. To that end, the
conflicts between the OEC and the Commercial Law should be elimi-
nated. The OEC's economic contract regime could be transformed to
rules of more specific types of contracts.
E. BANKING AND FINANCIAL REFORM
Since 1990, Vietnam's banking and financial sector has grown exponen-
tially,75 even though the country's capital formation focus has been di-
rected almost exclusively at foreign direct investment.76 In the late 1990s,
the government planned to move beyond heavy reliance on foreign direct
investments by raising investments from domestic sources for sustainable
economic growth. It is certain that any substantial progress for Vietnam's
capital formation efforts depends, in-large part, on Vietnam's ability to
develop its financial sector.77
Besides the domination of the state-owned banks, Vietnam's banking
business has been diversified with the participation of private joint-stock
banks, foreign joint venture banks, and branches of foreign banks since
the mid-1990s. The competing forces that came along with existence of
the joint-stock and foreign banks have transformed the commercial bank-
ing industry, in part by improving the technology of services. 78 Despite
an increase in number and market share, foreign and joint venture banks
are rather limited in their permitted operation,79 which is subject to, inter
alia, relatively high requirements of minimum capital,80 various compul-
sory reserve requirements (as to capital and deposits), limited acceptance
of Vietnamese currency deposits, and limitation of interest rates and fees
for foreign loans in U.S. dollar. As a result, most of them operate in the
realm of trade finance.81
At the same time, a large body of government regulations governing
and affecting the banking industry was issued without collaborative ef-
forts to make this industry efficient. For instance, under the land laws,
land use rights were inadequate as property interests in the context of the
government's unclear policies affecting such rights. 82 As a consequence,
banks are now less willing to extend loans without adequate collateral8 3
In late 1997, the Vietnamese Congress enacted the Law on State Bank
and Law on Credit Institutions, both becoming effective October 1, 1998.
Based on the old banking ordinances, the two laws are compiled to gov-
75. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 141.
76. Dinh, supra note 7, at 872.
77. Id. at 874.
78. Id. at 876; Nick Freeman, Going for a Dong, BANKER, Jan. 1996, at 33.
79. Dinh, supra note 7, at 876.
80. Id.; Frederik Balfour, Why Are We in Vietnam?, INST. INV., Jan. 1996, at 115.
81. Dinh, supra note 7, at 876; Profits in VN Tend to Be Illusory, Bus. VIETNAM, Dec.
1995.
82. Dinh, supra note 7, at 879.
83. Id.
2003]
158 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
ern the entire scope of banking activities and supervision. The principle
of lending based on the profitability of the project has been recognized.
Although the Law on Credit Institutions is considered to provide more
specific and efficient regulations for banking activities, bankers expect a
move toward lesser restriction on the banking industry and more reliance
on self-regulation within the industry.84 To further the banking reform
process, Vietnam must cope with the lack of a market oriented environ-
ment, strict foreign exchange control, obsolete banking infrastructure and
technology, state intervention with a large portfolio of under-performing
loans, and insufficient capacity of domestic banks' services.
The liberalization of the insurance sector was marked with the govern-
ment's removal of the state-owned insurer's monopoly in 1994.85 Since
then, several state-owned and joint-stock insurance companies were
formed, and over twenty foreign insurance companies set up representa-
tive offices in Vietnam. 86 Under the government's first regulation on in-
surance business, which was issued on December 18, 1993, a wide variety
of insurance services were permitted with regard to life, health, personal
accidents, property and loss, cargo, hull and civil liability for ship owners,
co-insurance, aviation, automobile, fire, cr-edit and financial risk, business
loss, agriculture, and other insurance services which shall be stipulated by
the Ministry of Finance. Under this regulation, insurance business is to
be organized in the form of state-owned enterprises, shareholding compa-
nies, mutual insurance companies, foreign-invested companies (either
joint venture or wholly foreign owned form under the LFI), or branches
of foreign insurance companies.
In the initial stage, very limited participation of foreign insurance com-
panies was allowed. Beginning in 1999, the Vietnamese insurance market
was opened to foreign investors. Four foreign life insurance companies
and several foreign property and loss insurance companies were granted
investment licenses to do business in Vietnam. The Law on Insurance
Business enacted on December 9, 2000, codified the previous government
regulations, including the legal framework for insurance business
activities. 87
Development of a securities market had long been planned by the
Vietnamese government in order to fully install market forces for the
transitional economy. The securities market operates to ensure efficient
allocation of capital and promote economic growth. In the context of
Vietnam, this market would also help to mobilize idle savings from the
public, which has long distrusted the banking system, and to expedite the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, Vietnam's earlier
stage of economic development did not seem adequate for such sophisti-
84. Bank Chiefs Heartened by Reform Efforts to Date, VIETNAM INV. REV. 1999, May
17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 16539261.
85. SCHOT, supra note 6, at 173.
86. Id.
87. Law on Insurance Business (Dec. 9, 2000) (Vietnam).
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cated capital markets. This was due to highly imperfect information, too
few stocks, 88 and a lack of legal and technical structure.
Vietnam's State Securities Commission (SSC) was established in late
1996 to oversee the future stock exchange. A regulatory framework set-
ting forth a stock exchange was formulated in 1998, with the issuance of
the government's regulations on the stock exchange. All business forms,
including foreign invested enterprises, are allowed to engage in securities
business (brokers, underwriters, investment funds, advisers). The existing
rules limit the amount that foreign investors can jointly hold to 20 percent
of any single listed company's equity. Foreign investors are not allowed
to sell shares for three years if they have taken part in the management of
the company during that period, while similar restrictions in many juris-
dictions are normally six months to a year. 89 The SSC accelerated the
qualification of several privatized state-owned enterprises' stocks. On
July 20, 2000, Vietnam's stock exchange was set up in Ho Chi Minh City
with the first four listed companies' stocks and government bonds. With
a very limited number of stocks offered thus far, the stock exchange is a
long way from being a main channel of the capital markets.
In an effort to pump moae securities into the stock market, the
Vietnamese government has carried out its pilot program to convert a
number of foreign invested companies into shareholding companies.
Once converted, those companies will list their stocks. This possibility is
attractive to foreign invested companies because the securities market
will serve as a source of capital and make their investments liquid. The
pilot program faces a lack of legal authority, because the Law on Foreign
Investment does not avail the form of shareholding company to foreign
investors. Foreign investors hope this move will eventually lead to some
relaxation of the restrictions placed on them as the issuers, purchasers,
and traders in Vietnam's stock exchange.
F. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Copyright laws, as part of intellectual property laws, have always ex-
isted in Vietnam, although the government paid little attention to the en-
forcement of these laws for a long time. Since Doi Moi, the Vietnamese
government has attempted to enforce the copyright laws and to take new
steps toward revamping the intellectual property protection system in Vi-
etnam. 90 The current intellectual property laws are embodied in the Civil
Code, which as of July 1, 1996, superseded the Ordinance on the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property Rights and the Ordinance on the Protection of
Copyrights. There are two regulatory regimes under Vietnam's intellec-
tual property laws that govern copyrights and "industrial property
88. Dinh, supra note 7, at 883-85.
89. Brown IV, supra note 55, at 107.
90. Rachel L. Nass, Trading Systems: Vietnam's Creation of a New Intellectual Property
Regime at the Inception of the Vietnam-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement, 27
BROOK. J. IN''L L. 285, 286 (2001).
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rights." 91 In a recent development, Vietnam extended intellectual prop-
erty rights to include trade secrets and trade names, and incorporated the
regime of unfair competition to the framework of intellectual property
protection.
The Civil Code provides that the industrial property rights of foreign
organizations and individuals that have been registered in Vietnam pursu-
ant to Vietnamese law shall be protected in accordance with Vietnamese
law and international treaties to which Vietnam is a party. 92 Vietnam is a
signatory to the Paris Convention and the Madrid Agreement, as well as
the Stockholm Convention of 1967 (which established the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization). However, since Vietnam's laws on intellec-
tual property are largely homegrown, all principles and systems may not
conform to international standards.
Vietnam has adopted a first-to-file rule, which gives trademark protec-
tion in Vietnam to the first party to file there with the exception of inter-
national, well-known trademarks. 93 Priority in applications for protection
is determined according to the date on which the relevant state authority
receives the application or in accordance with applicable international
treaties. Applicants who wish to rely on international treaties in estab-
lishing a right of priority must make an express statement to that effect in
their application, and must present evidence in support of their priority
claim. Until the United States becomes a member of the Madrid Agree-
ment, U.S. companies should register their property rights directly in Vi-
etnam rather than resort to such international registration.94
After a long history of dysfunctional application, the copyright regime
introduced by the Civil Code and implementing regulations provides im-
portant details and guidelines for registration, enforcement, and resolu-
tion of disputes.95 The Civil Code provides that copyright protection with
respect to foreign individuals and entities, will be limited to works which
are first published or disseminated in Vietnam or which are created and
take definite form in Vietnam. Many hoped that the Civil Code omits the
"thirty day rule," established in previous legislation, which required for-
eign authors to publish their works in Vietnam within thirty days of pub-
lishing the work elsewhere in order to receive protection in Vietnam.96
However, the implementing regulations of the Civil Code reinstate this
"thirty day rule." Foreign authors who first publish their works in an-
other country currently have to rely on international or bilateral treaties
to which Vietnam is a signatory (or enters into) for copyright protection
within Vietnam. At this time, only the United States has signed an agree-
91. Objects of industrial property rights which are protected under Vietnamese law
comprise inventions, utility solutions, industrial designs, trademarks and appella-
tion of origin of goods.
92. Vietnam's Civil Code, article 837.
93. Nass, supra note 90, at 301.
94. Frye, supra note 9, at 795.
95. Nass, supra note 90, at 299.
96. Id. at 300.
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ment for copyright protection with Vietnam, which overrides the "thirty
day rule" for its nationals.
In the late 1990s, the Vietnamese government attempted to improve
copyright law enforcement in order to attract foreign investors and to
participate in world trade.97 In 1996, Vietnam and the United States
signed an agreement for protection of copyrights as part of an eventual
bilateral trade agreement between the two countries. The United States
required Vietnam to enhance its copyright law to conform with common
copyright standards under the Universal Copyright Convention. 98
Under the Bilateral Trade Agreement signed with the United States on
July 13, 2000, Vietnam agreed to adopt the World Trade Organization
(WTO) standard for intellectual property protection. In order to bring it
in line with international standards, Vietnam is now in the stage of revis-
ing its intellectual property system and facilitating the implementation of
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under the
Bilateral Trade Agreement. 99
IV. VIETNAM'S INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION AND
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES
In the 1990s, Vietnam embarked on a new stage of international eco-
nomic integration along with its domestic economic reform. As the foun-
dation of the open door policy, Vietnam's foreign policies are diversified
to support economic progress and integrate itself into the international
trade system.
Once the George H. Bush administration ended so did the United
States's veto on new lending to Vietnam by multilateral aid organizations,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to resume lending to
Vietnam in October 1993. This announcement led the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank to recommence their lending shortly there-
after. 100 In February 1994, the Clinton administration lifted the embargo
on trade with Vietnam, and announced the normalization of diplomatic
relations with Vietnam in July 1995. Within a year, the United States
became the sixth largest foreign investor in Vietnam.
In 1995, Vietnam turned into the mainstream of Southeast Asia with its
membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Vietnam's trade with ASEAN members has increased by about 30 per-
cent every year' 0' and investment by ASEAN countries accounts for a
substantial part of foreign investment in Vietnam. In July 1995, Vietnam
also signed a trade cooperation agreement with the European Union in
97. Frye, supra note 9, at 796.
98. Id. at 798.
99. Nass, supra note 90, at 303.
100. Dinh, supra note 7, at 867.
101. Dao Dang Kien, Vietnam's Policy on and Economic Cooperation with ASEAN,
ECON DEV. REV., June 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 11712007.
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an effort to foster the trade and investment relations with Western Euro-
pean nations. In 1998, Vietnam joined the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) forum.
Although in 1995 Vietnam and the United States began negotiations of
a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), little progress was made for several
years since Vietnam resisted U.S. demands for increased access to Viet-
nam's market.10 2 In the absence of a BTA, the Clinton administration's
annual grant of a Jackson-Vanik waiver was initiated in 1998. This waiver
allowed the United States to begin extending U.S. export promotion and
investment support programs to Vietnam through Export-Import Bank,
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. 10 3 The year 2000, however, witnessed a quick move by
the Vietnamese government to conclude negotiations with the United
States on a BTA in the wake of China's entry into the World Trade Or-
ganization. 0 4 The BTA was signed on July 13, 2000, and ratified a year
later by the two nations' congresses, thus taking effect on December 19,
2001.
The BTA is a major step toward normalizing the two countries' com-
mercial relations as it restores reciprocal Most Favored Nation treat-
ment. 10 5 By entering into the BTA with Vietnam, the United States
hoped to promote far-reaching changes in the Vietnamese economy. 10 6
For the first time, Vietnam agreed to allow all Vietnamese firms and, over
time, U.S. persons and firms, the right to import and export freely from
within its borders. In addition, the BTA provides for a significant reduc-
tion in tariffs on exports from 40 percent to less than 3 percent, and it will
phase out all non-tariff measures by adherence to the WTO standards.
Moreover, Vietnam agreed to adopt the WTO standards for intellectual
property protection. U.S. persons and firms will be allowed to enter Viet-
nam's services market in the full range of services areas by the phased-in
time periods.
The BTA has led to additional significant measures by Vietnam. For
instance, Vietnam has agreed to protect U.S. investments from expropria-
tion, has eliminated local content and export performance requirements,
and agreed to phase out its investment-licensing regime for many sectors.
Vietnam has agreed to adopt a fully transparent regime in each agreed
upon area by issuing draft laws, regulations, and other rules for com-
ments. Vietnam is also ensuring that advance public notice is given for all
such laws and regulations, thus assuring that these documents are pub-
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lished and available, and allowing U.S. citizens the right to appeal rulings
made with respect to all such relevant laws and regulations. 10
7
After entering into the BTA with the United States, Vietnam is going
to conclude similar agreements with other countries, particularly with the
European Union and Japan. Vietnam's implementation of TRIPs under
the BTA and the restoration of its Most Favored Nation status with the
United States will make it likely to be accepted to the WTO. t0 8 If admit-
ted into the WTO, Vietnam will be entitled to non-discriminatory access
to all WTO members.' 0 9 In the immediate future, Vietnam's implementa-
tion of the BTA will help to raise its legal, regulatory, and economic sys-
tems to the WTO's standards."t 0
VI. Conclusion
Since Doi Moi, the legal system of Vietnam has developed substan-
tially, along with the economy's transformation and expansion. The Law
on Foreign Investment enacted in 1987 marked the starting point of Viet-
nam's legal reform process. A wide range of new laws has been intro-
duced in every aspect of the economy since that period. The laws enacted
thus far, however, show the tendency of over-regulation. The large vol-
ume of laws and regulations has not been directed to create the trans-
parency and predictability of an effective legal system. In the eyes of
Vietnamese authorities, the regulation has been viewed as the desired
method to shape and guarantee the development of economic relations.
In fact, however, regulation by all possible means and with such rigidity is
not always the best choice to facilitate the formation of new economic
relations in a transitional economy. In practice many economic sectors
indicate the need for deregulation to a certain extent, thus allowing con-
siderable competition.
Vietnam's over-regulation also stems in part from its mechanism of de-
centralized regulatory power. Law, that is congressional legislation,
leaves the application of implementing regulations by the government
and its administrative agencies. Such practice can be seen in many juris-
dictions. But in Vietnam, laws are normally drafted in very broad and
vague terms, and discretion is given to the executive branch in order to
put the laws into application. The problem is not so much the absence of
law, but a lack of experience in dealing with commercial business con-
cepts."' From the front end, laws lose their force to check the validity of
subordinate regulations and ensure the actual hierarchy of legislation.
From the back end, subordinate regulations may undermine national
laws 1 2 and conflict among themselves.
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Another factor implicated in the legal reform in Vietnam is the govern-
ment's skepticism regarding economic reform. One could see the see-saw
approach prevailing during Vietnam's reform process. This reflects the
tension between the control and market-oriented policies. In this regard,
law enactment could be relied on as a powerful tool to overcome hard-
line attitudes. The Law on Enterprise discussed above is observed as a
rare departure from the see-saw approach. The law sets out a firm re-
form regime within itself to mandate its enforcement by relevant
authorities.
Vietnam's quick gains in the early stage of reform may reflect elimina-
tion of inefficiencies in past economic mismanagement. 1 3 However, Vi-
etnam's business environment is still quite difficult. Businesses are
hindered in assessing the potential costs and risks of doing business in
Vietnam. 114 The principle of economic efficiency has not underlied the
recent proliferation of commercial-oriented regulations. Vietnam must
continue to reform its legal system. A stable legal framework designed to
translate policy into a set of rules of law will be necessary to foster and
sustain long-term economic development. 15 Vietnam is on the way to
open itself to global competition. Transparency and predictability in Vi-
etnam's legal system could be achieved through hard work and commit-
ment to the international standards.
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